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Abstract 
Psychometrics has always been confronted with fundamental criticism, highlighting serious 
insufficiencies and fallacies. Many fallacies persist, however, because each critic explores only 
some fallacies while still building on others. This article scrutinizes the epistemological, 
metatheoretical and methodological foundations of psychometrics, revealing a complex network 
of numerous conceptual fallacies underlying its framework of theory and practice. At its core lies 
a key challenge for psychology: the necessity to distinguish the phenomena under study from 
the means used to explore them (e.g., concepts, methods, data). This distinction is intricate 
because concepts constitute psychical phenomena in themselves and many psychical 
phenomena are accessible only through language-based methods. The analyses show how 
insufficient consideration of this important distinction and common misconceptions about 
concepts and language (e.g., signifier-referent conflation; reification of constructs) led to 
conflations of disparate notions of key terms in psychological measurement (e.g., ‘variables’, 
‘attributes’, ‘causality’) and numerous interrelated fallacies (e.g., construct-referent conflation, 
phenomenon-quality-quantity conflation, numeral-number conflation). These fallacies are 
maintained and masked by repeated conceptual back-and-forth switching between two 
incompatible epistemological frameworks, 1) an operationist framework of data modelling 
implemented through methodical and statistical operations and 2) a realist framework of 
measurement sporadically invoked in theoretical considerations but neither theoretically 
elaborated nor empirically implemented. The analyses demonstrate that psychometrics 
constitutes only data modelling but not data generation or even measurement as often assumed 
and that analogies to (indirect or fundamental) physical measurement are mistaken. They 
provide theoretical support for the increasing criticism of psychometrics and its use in research 
and applied contexts.  
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Developing methods to quantify properties of study phenomena is a central task in many 
sciences. Psychometrics, the field concerned with ‘measuring the mind’ (Borsboom, 2005), is 
aimed at making this possible for psychical phenomena despite the obvious differences from 
physical phenomena and inapplicability of physical measuring instruments. Over the last 
century, psychometrics has become a flourishing field with substantial commercial impact. But 
from the start, numerous lines of critique were voiced, highlighting serious insufficiencies and 
problems, such as the implicit but untested assumption of quantitative properties in psychical 
phenomena (Michell, 2008), the focus on correlational rather than causal relations for validation 
(Borsboom, 2005), the lack of representation theorems (Kyngdon, 2008a) and insufficient 
conceptual understanding of concepts and language (Maraun & Gabriel, 2013). Various fallacies 
were highlighted, such as erroneous equations of constructs with their referents (Slaney & 
Garcia, 2015) and of latent variables with constructs (Maraun & Halpin, 2008) as well as 
erroneous analogies with physical measurement ((Trendler, 2019; Uher, 2020a).  
Although clearly recognized, these fallacies still persist in pertinent publications—even in 
the writings of scholars who are critically discussing their detrimental impact on psychological 
research. This is because all these fallacies are tightly interrelated and build upon each other, 
forming a complex network that underlies the psychometric framework of conceptual thinking 
and empirical practice. But each single critic typically focusses on just a subset of the fallacies 
already known, while implicitly still building on other fallacies in their thinking. This fragmentation 
entails that the entirety of fallacies and their complex interplay are not yet fully understood and 
that their effects on the theories and practices established in psychometrics have not yet been 
fully analyzed.  
This article aims to put together the puzzle of the different lines of criticism voiced against 
psychometrics as measurement, to complement them with further fallacies still not well 
considered, and to highlight their interdependencies. This network of fallacies is central to the 
framework of psychometric theory and practice—and first establishes its functionality. 
Understanding its complexity and functioning is crucial for developing alternative approaches 
and methods of measurement in psychology that help avoid these fallacies in the future.  
Transdisciplinary philosophy-of-science analyses 
Psychologists, especially those concerned with measurement, often identify explicitly not 
as philosophers (Alexandrova & Haybron, 2016). But this is not a strength. It is a weakness. 
Psychology emerged from philosophy and—as every science—it builds on a philosophy of 
science, whether or not explicitly elaborated. The corresponding German term 
‘Wissenschaftstheorie’ (theory of science) may describe this field more appropriately. Clearly 
both philosophy and theory are needed to scientifically explore the making of science, as this 
journal’s name shows. Philosophical-theoretical research is essential for analyzing and 
overcoming the problems of psychological measurement (Haig & Borsboom, 2008). But many 
quantitative psychologists are still fairly reluctant to study the philosophy-of-science foundations 
of their own research and relevant concepts are often missing in publications.  
Exploring the network of conceptual fallacies underlying psychometrics requires not only 
a philosophy-of-science approach but one that also cuts across disciplines in order to capitalize 
on and learn from other sciences’ theories and practices of measurement, especially from those 
of metrology, the science of measurement, which is foundational for the physical sciences. But 
why should metrologists’ concepts matter given that their physical study objects differ 
substantially from those of psychologists? Necessarily, different phenomena and properties 
require different approaches and methods (Bohr, 1937; Heisenberg, 1927; Uher, 2019); thus, 
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metrology need not matter at all for psychology. The point here however is that, when numerical 
data are generated and mathematically and statistically analyzed in order to describe and 
explore real-world phenomena, the generation of these data must be based on some 
transparent principles that are applied consistently across sciences and that ensure that the 
mathematical and statistical results obtained allow to make justified inferences about the study 
phenomena. This is essential for developing knowledge about these phenomena that can be set 
in relation to findings from other investigations about the same or other real-world phenomena—
no matter in which science they may have been produced—thus, for establishing a secured 
knowledge base. It is also a matter of scientificity; a process as foundational to science as 
measurement cannot have entirely different meanings in different fields. Transdisciplinary 
analyses are therefore helpful to explore differences and commonalities in the measurement 
practices of different sciences and to identify basic principles that are applicable to all.  
The present analyses rely on the Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for 
Research on Individuals (TPS-Paradigm; (Uher, 2015c, 2018c) in which established concepts 
from various disciplines, complemented by novel ones, have been integrated into philosophical, 
metatheoretical and methodological frameworks that coherently build upon each other. These 
frameworks highlight connections, differences and communalities across sciences, and thus 
starting points for cross-scientific collaboration (Uher, 2020b). Together with its focus on 
research on individuals, including critical considerations of scientists’ own role in research 
processes, the TPS-Paradigm therefore provides useful conceptual foundations for the present 
analyses. Some relevant concepts will be introduced below where needed; more information and 
references are provided in the footnotes, extensive elaborations elsewhere1.  
Necessarily, such transdisciplinary and philosophy-of-science frameworks require a 
terminology that is more abstract than that used for the specific theories, concepts, methods and 
approaches in the given disciplines and that inevitably diverges from any mono-disciplinary 
standard. This may feel unfamiliar to some readers. But for the present analyses this it is 
essential because key terms of psychological measurement codify conceptual fallacies and thus 
contribute to these fallacies’ persistence in the field (Uher, 2021).  
Critical realism: A philosophy for exploring the natural, social and experiential world  
Many psychologists argue that, because measurement is about gaining knowledge about 
the natural world, psychological measurement must be grounded in scientific realism 
(Borsboom, 2005; Maul, 2013; Michell, 1999). The core idea of this epistemology is that both 
observable and unobservable phenomena can be explored and that true knowledge can be 
generated about them. This involves, metaphysically, the belief in the spatio-temporal existence 
of the world independent of its perception and conception by some conscious beings (mind-
independent reality); semantically, the literal interpretation of scientific claims as describing this 
mind-independent reality; and epistemologically, the idea that thus-interpreted scientific claims 
yield true knowledge about that real world (Chakravartty, 2017).  
 
 
1 The TPS-Paradigm has already been applied 1) to integrate and expand on previous concepts of individuals’ 
psyche, behavior, language and contexts (Uher, 2013, 2015a, 2015c, 2016b, 2016a); 2) to refine and newly develop 
concepts and methodologies for taxonomising and comparing individual differences in various kinds of phenomena 
and populations (Uher, 2015b, 2015d, 2015e, 2018b, 2018c), and 3) to critically analyze concepts, theories and 
practices of data generation and measurement across the sciences (Uher, 2019, 2020a) and in quantitative 
psychology (Uher, 2018a, 2021). Applications are demonstrated in multi-method studies with humans and other 
species (e.g., (Uher, 2015b, 2018a; Uher, Addessi, et al., 2013; Uher & Visalberghi, 2016; Uher, Werner, & Gosselt, 
2013). http://researchonindividuals.org.  
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In psychological measurement, however, scientific realism often takes the form of naïve 
realism involving assumptions that invariant quantities would exist in the world and 
independently of the methods used—ideas that even metrologists reject (Mari et al., 2017). More 
critical stances are needed, in particular, given that psychologists aim to explore individuals and 
the specific reality of their minds. How can this reality be mind-independent (Stent, 1969)? The 
point however is not, as some proponents of scientific realism seem to believe, to deny the 
existence of a reality, which includes the minds of the beings that form part of it; instead, it is 
about the ways in which we can explore that reality. The philosophical framework of the TPS-
Paradigm comprises the presumption that all science is done by humans and that we can gain 
access to this reality only through our human perceptual and conceptual abilities (interpretations; 
Peirce, 1958, CP 2.308; Wundt, 1907), which inevitably limits our possibilities to explore and 
understand this reality. This should not be mistaken for ideas of radical constructivism (von 
Glasersfeld, 1991), which involve the assumption that knowledge could be developed without 
reference to a mind-independent ontological reality to which humans, as a species, have 
adapted over millions of years (Uher, 2015a). Instead, the presupposition made in the TPS-
Paradigm highlights the fact that psychologists are always individuals themselves and thus, 
cannot be independent of their objects of research, unlike most natural scientists. Indeed, 
psychologists aim to explore minds—being equipped with nothing but a mind (Stent, 1969). This 
entails that psychologists’ presuppositions about their study phenomena are (inevitably) 
influenced by the (explicit and implicit) beliefs that they have developed about these phenomena 
from their own, inherently anthropo-centric, ethno-centric and ego-centric experiences 
(Fahrenberg, 2013; Uher, 2015c, 2020b).  
This epistemological stance comes close to that of critical realism, which emphasizes the 
reality of the objects of research and their knowability but also that our knowledge about this 
reality is created on the basis of our practical engagement with and collective appraisal of that 
reality (Bhaskar & Danermark, 2006). Hence, assumptions about the existence of reality must be 
distinguished from claims of the existence of truth because, without sentences, there is no truth. 
Sentences are elements of human languages, and human languages are human creations. 
“Truth cannot be out there—cannot exist independently of the human mind—because sentences 
cannot so exist or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not. Only 
descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world on its own—unaided by the describing 
activities of human beings—cannot” (Rorty, 1995, p. 5). What scientific communities establish as 
truth is thus a result of their consensus, designed from language games (Wittgenstein, 2009). 
That is, knowledge generation is not an increasing understanding of reality ‘as it really is’. 
Instead, knowledge is increasingly useful to meet socio-practical demands—and therefore 
always theory-laden, socially embedded and historically contingent (Maraun, 1998; Maraun et 
al., 2009; Pinheiro, 2020). 
Outline of the article 
The article first discusses psychology’s key challenge of distinguishing the phenomena 
under study from the means used for their exploration (e.g., concepts, methods, terms, data). To 
elaborate the intricacies of this distinction, it introduces metatheoretical concepts from the TPS-
Paradigm that clarify the ontology of constructs (as one of psychology’s most frequent study 
phenomena) as well as that of sign systems, in particular of language and data, and elucidate 
their functions for abstract thinking and science. These concepts are then used to elaborate in 
detail how insufficient consideration of this important distinction as well as common 
misconceptions about concepts and language led to conflations of disparate notions of key 
terms in psychological measurement and numerous interrelated fallacies. Thereafter, these 
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conceptual and terminological fallacies are used to scrutinize the concepts and practices of 
‘measurement’ established in psychometrics. For this purpose, and to highlight commonalities 
and differences with metrology, the article introduces basic methodological principles from the 
TPS-Paradigm that were shown to underlie metrologists’ concepts of measurement and 
measuring instruments and to be also applicable to psychological study phenomena. These 
principles are applied to demonstrate the ways in which the dense network of fallacies 
highlighted in this article underlies the pathways of reasoning in psychometrics that led to 
erroneous analogies with physical measurement and to the widespread but erroneous belief that 
psychometric modelling approaches could constitute measurement. The article closes by 
highlighting some far-reaching consequences and general directions for future developments. 
Psychology’s core challenges arising from their study phenomena’s peculiarities  
Psychologists face intricate challenges that arise from the peculiarities of their study 
phenomena (Uher, 2016a, 2020b). Unlike physical phenomena, for example, psychical 
phenomena are subject matter of a comprehensive everyday knowledge and language. But 
psychologists seldom reflect on the ways in which their lay psychology influences their own 
scientific psychology, such as when using everyday terms in language-based methods like rating 
scales (Uher, 2013, 2015d). Further challenges arise because psychologists’ study phenomena 
involve also those by which all science is made (e.g., thinking, conceptualizing; Valsiner, 2012). 
All this requires psychologists to distinguish their study phenomena from the means (e.g., 
concepts, terms, methods, data) used to explore them—a distinction reflected in the terms 
psychical versus psychological2 in the TPS-Paradigm (and many non-English languages). In 
psychology, however, this important distinction is seldom considered; indeed, it underlies many 
key fallacies that are inherent to psychometrics, as shown in this article.  
To provide the necessary foundations for these analyses, this section’s remainder briefly 
outlines metatheoretical concepts from the TPS-Paradigm that clarify the ontology of constructs 
and their function for exploring psychical and behavioral phenomena as well as the nature of 
sign systems like language and data and their roles for abstract thinking and science. These 
concepts will be applied, in the subsequent section, to explore conceptual problems and fallacies 
encoded in key terms of psychological measurement and to trace their possible origins in 
common misconceptions about concepts and language. 
Constructs in psychology: Ontology and relevance 
Ongoing psychical3 phenomena, as well as many behaviors4, are transient in nature and 
therefore conceived as occurrents (perdurants in formal ontology)—as processes. Of processual 
entities, only a part exists at a given moment; hence, they cannot be determined without 
knowledge of their previous occurrences. Occurrents are distinguished from continuants 
(endurants in formal ontology), which do exist in their entirety at any moment (e.g., material 
objects). As processes, psychical phenomena can be conceived only through abstraction from 
 
 
2 From Greek -λογία, -logia for body of knowledge (Lewin, 1936; Uher, 2016a). Analogously, we may get viral (but not 
virological) infections and we do virological research.  
3 The psyche is defined in the TPS-Paradigm as the “entirety of the phenomena of the immediate experiential reality 
both conscious and non-conscious of living organisms” (Uher, 2015c, p. 431), with immediacy indicating absence of 
phenomena mediating their perception (Wundt, 1896). 
4 In the TPS-Paradigm, behaviors are metatheoretically defined as the “external changes or activities of living 
organisms that are functionally mediated by other external phenomena in the present moment” (Uher, 2016b, p. 490). 
This definition highlights essential differences in the accessibility of behaviors and psychical phenomena. 
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their occurrences over time, leading to concepts, beliefs and knowledge about them, which are 
psychical phenomena in themselves as well but different from and necessarily more stable than 
those they are about5 (Uher, 2016a; Whitehead, 1929).  
This explains why abstractions and complex ideas that are theoretically constructed by 
humans, called constructs, are among psychology’s most frequent study phenomena (Maraun et 
al., 2009; Slaney, 2017). Their abstract theoretical nature entails that these conceptual entities 
often have several construct referents. Referents can be considered on different levels of 
abstraction; they may involve various concrete phenomena that are perceivable at a given 
moment (e.g., behaviors, emotions) but also conceptual entities (e.g., sub-constructs) that are 
each linked with their own set of more concrete referents. That is, referents can have nested 
conceptual structures in which meanings and referents can be ‘inherited’ from other concepts 
(Uher, 2021). Abstraction involves that construing persons emphasize some aspects of the 
referents they consider, while deemphasizing others. Therefore, any given construct cannot 
reflect its referents in the same ways as these can be perceived at any moment (Vygotsky, 
1962; Whitehead, 1929). Differences in the particular referents, aspects and levels of abstraction 
that persons (implicitly) consider enable unparalleled proliferation and complexity—and thus 
changeability and diversity in the constructs created.  
This highlights another key challenge in psychology that is still not well considered. The 
scientific concepts used to explore psychical phenomena constitute psychical phenomena in 
themselves—and thus do not exist outside of the empirical systems under study (Uher, 2020b). 
This substantially complicates the important distinction between the study phenomena and the 
means used for their exploration. Further complications arise from human language, which is 
inevitable for doing science and many psychological study phenomena are accessible only 
through language.  
Language and its essential function for abstract conceptual thinking 
Language plays a key role in science because scientists must describe and explain their 
study phenomena. Moreover, language and other sign systems have important functions for 
abstract thinking. They enable us to represent perceivable phenomena and their properties (e.g., 
two large owls) in single words (e.g., ‘two’, ‘large’, ‘owls’). In words, we can make concrete 
entities independent of their immediate perception and abstract them into objects of 
consideration (conceptual entities)—thus, reifying them (e.g., ‘size’; ‘birds’). Through this 
hypostatic abstraction (Peirce, 1958), CP 4.227), we develop words that refer to concrete 
referents also in their absence, thus abstracted from the here and now. We can also develop 
words that have abstract referents, such as concepts and ideas describing phenomena and 
properties distant from immediate perception (e.g., ‘animals’) or imperceptible in themselves 
(e.g., ‘quantity’; (Uher, 2015a, 2016b). That is, every word is a concept in itself (Vygotsky, 1962). 
This contributes to the intricacies of distinguishing the phenomena under study from the means 
needed for their exploration.  
These challenges also concern the data systems that scientists generate about their 
study phenomena. So, what actually are ‘data’ and what function do they fulfil in science? 
 
 
5 Transient psychical events (e.g., thoughts, emotions), called experiencings (Erleben) in the TPS-Paradigm, can be 
distinguished from temporally more persistent phenomena (e.g., beliefs, mental abilities), called memorized psychical 
resultants or experiences (Erfahrung; with memorization referring to any retention process). But these latter can be 
accessed only in individuals’ experiencings (Uher, 2016a), and must be reconstructed in each moment anew within 
the given context, whereby they are adapted and changed before becoming memorized again (Schacter & Addis, 
2007). 
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Data and their function in science 
Data6 are signs (symbols, mathematical or semiotic representations; e.g., Indo-Arabic 
numerals, Latin or Greek letters) that scientists use to indicate information about the study 
phenomena and properties and to which they attribute particular meanings (e.g., numbers, 
qualities). As signs (e.g., variable names and values), the function of data is to represent in 
physically persistent ways (e.g., printed or digital spreadsheets) information about properties and 
phenomena as conceived by the data-generating persons. This representational function of 
signs is so deeply engrained in our language and thinking that we seldom become aware that 
any sign—every word of natural language, every scientific term, and every mathematical 
symbol—comprises three distinct components (Figure 1a). These are (1) a physical, publicly 
accessible component (e.g., phonetic or visual patterns like /faɪv/, 5, V, IIIII) used as signifier 
that symbolically represents (2) the referent, the actual object of consideration to which it refers 
(e.g., phenomenon, property, construct), and (3) the meaning (signified) that both have for the 
sign-using persons in a given context (Salvatore, 2019), which is a psychical phenomenon in 
itself (see similarly, Ogden & Richards, 1923). We become acutely aware of these three 
components when learning a foreign language because this involves learning the specific 
signifiers used in that language (e.g., Eule, chouette, gufo, нея́сыть7), their relations to particular 
referents (e.g., owls) and the meanings that they may have for speakers of that language (e.g., a 
bird, colloquial for a night person). It is the tight conceptual relationships among these three 
components that first establish the functionality of this triadic composite as a sign (Figure 1a).  
Conceptual fallacies and disparate notions of key terms  
The just-introduced metatheoretical concepts of constructs, psyche, behavior and of sign 
systems like language and data are applied in this section to explore common misconceptions of 
concepts and language and to highlight their role in the conceptual fallacies inherent to 
psychometrics. The analyses will also reveal that these fallacies are codified in and thus 
maintained by important key terms in the field. 
Signifier–sign equation involves signifier–meaning and signifier–referent conflations 
In everyday life, but also in science, the tight triadic interrelations among the three 
components of signs (see above) are seldom explicitly considered. This entails various fallacies 
such that signs (e.g., words, data, terms) are often—and be it just implicitly—equated with their 
most directly apparent component, their signifier. This signifier–sign equation ignores the 
signifier’s intricate relations to a referent as well as to the meaning linking both and without 
which a signifier (literally) could not signify something (Figure 1b). This fallacy often occurs in 
language-based methods, such as those used in psychometrics in which verbal information is 
presented to respondents who must respond in likewise verbal form (e.g., rating scales, IQ 
tests). It is reflected, for example, in the belief that “what really matters in validity is how the test 
works, and this is […] a property […] of the measurement instrument itself (i.e., of the concrete, 
physical thing that you can drop on your feet, rather than of a linguistic entity)” 8 (italics added; 




6 The term data is used inconsistently in psychology; see the section Disparate notions of ‘variables’… below. 
7 These signifiers mean owl in German, French, Italian and Russian. 
8 This statement implies that digital and paper versions of the same scale, given their different physical properties, 
could also differ in their measurement properties—a, for the digital age, surprising statement. 
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Figure 1. Sign systems, their three components, and common fallacies about them. (a) The three 
components of sign systems; (b) signifier–sign equation; (c) signifier–meaning conflation; and (d) 
signifier–referent conflation. This includes conceptual phenomena (e.g., other constructs) as well.  
 
Signifier–sign equation involves that people also erroneously assume that a sign’s 
meaning would be contained in the signifier itself. This signifier–meaning conflation (Figure 1c) is 
reflected, for example, in the widespread assumption that standardizing signifiers (e.g., writing 
down item wordings) could allow to standardize also their meanings across persons, times and 
contexts. But this ignores pronounced individual variation in item interpretations—thus, 
subjectivity—that occurs even if all psychometric criteria are met (Lundmann & Villadsen, 2016; 
Rosenbaum & Valsiner, 2011; Uher, 2018a; Uher & Visalberghi, 2016). 
Signifier–sign equation furthermore involves that the signifier is mistaken for its referent, 
thus signifier–referent conflation (Figure 1d). But signifiers do not carry their meanings in 
themselves; signifiers are largely arbitrary and can therefore denote different referents (e.g., M, 
D, C, L can signify letters or numerals). The triadic concept of signs (Figure 1a) thus highlights 
that the meaning of particular data is not given by their signifiers. Instead, signifiers are 
interpreted as representing particular phenomena and properties (referents) only given particular 
theories and expectations (meaning9). With different theories, data may be interpreted differently 
(Van Fraassen, 2012); this explains why data are always theory-laden (Boon, 2015; Kuhn, 
1962).  
These conflations of the three distinct components of sign systems are widespread in 
everyday life. They led to many conceptual fallacies in psychometrics as elaborated now. 
 
 
9 To highlight the meaning component’s essential role for establishing the triadic interrelations, sign systems are 
called semiotic representations in the TPS-Paradigm (Uher, 2015c, 2015a).   
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Disparate notions of the term ‘variable’ entail variable–referent conflation  
The term ‘variable’ is central to psychological measurement. It has, however, two 
disparate notions that are seldom clearly distinguished and that are, due to signifier–referent 
conflation, often conflated with one another. This conflation lies at the bottom of major fallacies 
in psychometrics. Specifically, ‘variables’ denote variability. Variability in phenomena and 
properties is often in the focus of research because it can reveal important information about 
their structures and functionings. Likely for this reason, psychologists often refer to their study 
phenomena and properties in themselves as ‘variables’ (e.g., age, ‘extraversion’, ‘neuroticism’, 
psychical phenomena located in people’s heads). This may explain why many psychologists 
speak of studying ‘variables’ rather than of studying phenomena or properties (see Maraun & 
Gabriel, 2013). But, at the same time, psychologists also speak of ‘variables’ in terms of the 
elements of their data sets that they subject to statistical analysis (e.g., item variables, data sets 
in variables by cases format; variable-oriented analyses), thus as the semiotic encodings of their 
study phenomena and properties (e.g., located on computers). In metrology as well, variables 
constitute the results of measurement but not the properties to be measured (Mari et al. 2015; 
Uher, 2020).  
But importantly, these two notions are not just different—they are mutually exclusive. The 
former refers to the phenomena and properties under study in themselves, the latter refers to 
their semiotic encodings. Whatever notion one may prefer, ‘variables’ cannot be both the 
empirical system under study and the symbolic (data) system analyzed in lieu of the former. This 
is a prime example of the challenges that language-based methods entail for the essential 
distinction of the study phenomena from the means used for their exploration. Their failed 
distinction entails conceptual fallacies in which scientists frequently (without necessarily being 
aware of this) switch conceptually between these two disparate notions of ‘variables’. This 
conceptual switching, promoted by scientific (or even naïve) realist beliefs, leads scientists to 
conflate the phenomena and properties under study with their semiotic encodings, and thus 
entails variable–referent conflation (with ‘variables10’ denoting semiotic encodings; Figure 2; 
(Maraun & Halpin, 2008; Uher, 2015e; Woodward, 2011).  
Here, the term (data) variables is used in the sense of semiotic encodings, whereby the 
inserted “(data)” is intended to remind readers of this notion. However, the term ‘data’ itself is 
afflicted with disparate notions and signifier–referent conflation. It often denotes semiotic 
encodings (mathematical representations, e.g., variable names, values) as used here. But it also 
seems be used for the sample itself, thus the specific set of phenomena, properties and 
individuals studied from the universe of all possible ones (e.g., in Borsboom & Mellenbergh, 
2004)—in line with the meaning of ‘variable’ as denoting the research objects in themselves. 
Construct–referent conflation 
A further fallacy that is promoted by sign-signifier equation and signifier–meaning and 
signifier–referent conflations of words in general and that is therefore widespread in research 
with language-based methods such as psychometrics is to conflate constructs as theoretical-
logical-linguistic thinking tools with their construct referents, thus with the real-world entities that 
they are meant to denote (Danziger, 1997). Here again, the study phenomena are not 
distinguished from the concepts and methods used for their exploration. This construct–referent 
 
 
10 Ideally, the term ‘variable’ should be replaced by two others to clearly distinguish its two distinct notions. 
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conflation11 (Figure 2; Slaney & Garcia, 2015) occurs, for example, when scientists interpret 
constructs as reflecting ‘attributes’ or qualities that individuals ‘possess’ (e.g., in Cronbach & 
Meehl, 1955), thus ascribing them an ontological status, as widely done with ‘trait’ constructs 
(Uher, 2013, 2015e). The construal of constructs allowed scientists to turn abstract ideas into 
entities, thereby making them conceptually accessible to empirical study. But this entification 
misguided psychologists to overlook their constructed nature (Slaney & Garcia, 2015) and to 
focus primarily on methodological and methodical approaches, ignoring the necessity to develop 
their epistemological foundations as well (Hanfstingl, 2019). 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual fallacies derived from misconceptions of language and concepts. The 
term variable here means semiotic encodings. 
Latent variable–construct conflation 
We can create words to denote entities construed on all levels of abstraction—and thus 
also labels for the (data) variables used to semiotically encode such conceptual entities. (Data) 
variables encoding abstract conceptual entities are often conceived as latent (data) variables, 
such as the synthesized variable ‘extraversion’ summarizing scores of several manifest (data) 
variables that each encode more specific entities (e.g., behaviors). The availability of single-word 
labels for abstract conceptual entities (e.g., ‘extraversion’, ‘neuroticism’), however, often 
misleads people to treat them as concrete entities that are located in the world or inside people 
(fallacy of misplaced concreteness; Whitehead, 1929; also Peirce, 1958). This reification of 
linguistic abstractions is promoted through the disparate yet often not distinguished notions of 
 
 
11 Slaney and Garcia termed this construct-entity conflation; but an entity can also be a construct (conceptual entity) in 
itself and construct referents can be other constructs as well. 
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the term ‘variable’. In conjunction with variable–referent conflation, this leads to erroneous 
conflations of (data) variables denoting constructs (called ‘collective variables’; Thelen & Smith, 
1994) with these constructs in themselves, thus to latent variable–construct conflation (Figure 2; 
Maraun & Halpin, 2008). A (data) variable labelled ‘extraversion’ is then conflated with the 
abstract concept of ‘extraversion’ that it encodes and this, in turn, is conflated with its various 
referents in participants’ experience and behavior (construct–referent conflation; Figure 2).  
Kinds of referents encoded in (data) variables: Implications for statistical analysis 
For meaningful interpretations of statistical analyses of (data) variables (located on 
computer) with regard to the real-world phenomena and properties under study (e.g., located in 
individuals), it is essential to know what exactly is encoded in the (data) variables. This is 
because their statistical relationships are being analyzed in lieu of those of the phenomena and 
properties under study in order to unravel possible causal relations among those latter. The fact 
that psychologists encode in (data) variables all kinds of referents and on all levels of abstraction 
entails problems that seriously undermine the meaningfulness of statistical analyses (on 
computer) and their interpretation with regard to the actual phenomena and properties under 
study (in individuals) and their interrelations (Toomela, 2008).  
Specifically, constructs have diverse referents each featuring various aspects that are 
considered and emphasized differently; therefore, constructs cannot represent any of these 
referents as they may occur in individuals. The encoding of constructs in collective variables 
entails that possible causal relations of those construct referents (explanantia), individually or 
collectively, with the phenomenon to be explained (explandum) cannot be explored. This is 
because, in collective variables, it is impossible to differentiate the relation of a single referent 
from the whole construct system in which it may be involved. This may mask the actual causal 
relations so that statisticians may misleadingly understand the composite of referents as a cause 
instead of just one single referent, or vice versa, one single referent instead of the whole 
composite. Causality may also be erroneously attributed to one particular referent although 
another referent of the composite is actually important. For example, the widely used construct 
of sex/gender may refer, amongst others, to genetic, hormonal, bodily, behavioral and cultural 
differences, but which ones are actually relevant and causally related to a given target 
phenomenon and in what ways cannot be analyzed with this collective (construct) variable (for 
details and further problems, see Toomela, 2008)  
These problems are of particular concern for psychometricians because they focus on 
constructs to study psychical and behavioral phenomena and because many of the rating item 
variables therefore used describe not concrete but conceptual entities (e.g., ‘habitual behaviors’; 
(Uher, 2020a). This concerns all psychometric methods of analysis that are aimed at exploring 
causal relationships, thus latent variable models (Borsboom, 2008), latent network models and 
their combinations (Epskamp et al. 2017; Guyon et al., 2017) alike. 
Disparate notions of the term ‘attribute’ and their conflation 
The problems entailed by the undifferentiated use of term ‘variable’ are fortified by 
analogous problems with the term ‘attribute’, another key term with disparate notions that are 
frequently conflated with one another leading to conceptual fallacies. Specifically, it is variously 
stated that ‘psychological attributes’ “can be said to be real” and to “exist as emergent features 
of conscious beings”, such as being in pain or hungry (Maul, 2013, p. 756) and that there are 
‘attributes of persons’, such as extraversion, emotional intelligence, knowledge, working memory 
capacity, beliefs, intentional states and gender, as well as ‘composite attributes’ depicted as 
concepts or terms that refer to sets of such ‘person attributes’ (Maul, 2013). ‘Attributes’ are 
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assumed to be quantitatively structured (Michell, 1999) and to causally produce variations in the 
results obtained from measurement procedures (Borsboom, 2005). It is stated that there can be 
within-person and between-person variation in ‘attributes’ and that individuals can have a 
position on an ‘attribute’ (Borsboom & Mellenbergh, 2007). The term ‘attributes’ is also used to 
denote properties of physical objects (e.g., temperature, velocity; Maul, 2013). These are just 
some examples of the disparate notions ascribed to the term ‘attribute’, denoting either 1) 
psychical phenomena in themselves; 2) constructs and terms about them; 3) properties that may 
occur in study phenomena and objects, and that may be quantitative and may interact with 
measuring instruments; as well as 4) (data) variables that semiotically encode 1) to 3).  
The conflation of these disparate notions is yet another example of the failed distinction 
of the phenomena and properties under study from the means used for their exploration. This 
example also illustrates the codification of this failed distinction, and thus its maintenance, in a 
key term of the field.  
Phenomenon–quality–quantity conflation  
The disparate notions of key terms are often masked by the common nominalization of 
‘variables’, ‘attributes’ and constructs (e.g., ‘traits’; Slaney & Garcia, 2015), and the entification 
that this entails. Entification also masks another key fallacy in psychological measurement—the 
frequent failure to specify the phenomena, qualities and quantities studied. Psychologists often 
ignore that phenomena (or objects) in themselves cannot be measured; only properties can be. 
Any phenomenon (or object) typically features various properties of different qualities. 
Behaviors, for example, have temporal and spatial properties; they may also be ascribed 
constructed qualities of social desirability, amongst others. Bricks have the properties of length, 
weight, density, hardness, color, and temperature, amongst others. Therefore, scientists must 
specify in their study phenomena (objects) the particular quality of interest; one cannot just 
measure a behavior or a brick.  
This specification is also a precondition for measurement because quantities are always 
of something—a quality. Qualities (from Latin qualis for "of what sort, of such a kind") are 
properties differing in kind, whereas quantities (from Latin quantus for “how much, how many”) 
are divisible properties of entities of the same kind—the same quality (Hartmann, 1964). 
Quantities are qualitatively homogenous; adding or dividing their magnitude does not change 
their meaning; for example, adding entities of length keeps their quality as being that of length 
unaltered, whereas this is not possible for perceived color. Divisible properties of the same 
quality differ only quantitatively, never qualitatively (Michell, 2012).  
Entities of the same quality can be compared in their divisible properties (quantities) 
regarding that quality. In behaviors, divisible properties can be identified in their temporal and 
spatial qualities (Uher, 2015b, 2018a); for empirical examples, Uher, Addessi, et al., 2013). But 
in the manifold qualities of experiencing, what properties could be divisible? What divisible 
properties could there be in the abstractions needed to study these transient processual 
phenomena? And how could divisible properties be identified in constructs, thus in abstract 
conceptual entities that have heterogeneous real-world referents, each featuring different and 
also differently emphasized qualitative properties?   
Confusion about heterogenous versus homogenous ‘orders’ 
The fact that the qualitative heterogeneity of psychical phenomena precludes their 
measurement was recognized, amongst others, already by Binet end of the 19th century, as 
Michell (2012) highlighted. Both use the term heterogeneous ‘order’ for the hierarchical 
organisation of constructs by their level of generality and abstraction, such as in intelligence 
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research or in the biological classification of species, as Michell illustrates. But contrasting this 
taxonomic ‘order’ with homogeneous ‘order’ in terms of positional information about a series of 
magnitudes of the same quality (Michell, 2012) implies that these disparate notions of ‘order’ 
would be somehow comparable. In terms of taxonomic order, the same person can be said to be 
a human, primate, mammal, vertebrate and animal; all this concerns only more abstract levels of 
consideration of the same entity. Ordinality, by contrast, refers to relations among different 
entities, such as different persons’ body length, which can be ordered according to their 
magnitude. The undifferentiated use of the term ‘order’ for both taxonomic classification and 
ordinality obscures essential conceptual differences, thereby contributing to the common belief 
that constructs could be measurable and thus thwarting Michell’s long-standing efforts to clarify 
misconceptions about the measurability of psychical phenomena.  
Measurement: Most basic concepts, principles and processes  
The conceptual fallacies and disparate notions of key terms of psychological 
measurement analyzed up to here are now used in this section to scrutinize the concepts and 
practices of ‘measurement’ established in psychometrics, highlighting commonalities and 
differences to concepts of measurement from metrology. 
Measurement requires “one to spell out … why one is treating the data patterns as 
measurements” (Kyngdon, 2008b, p. 109)—that is, some basic criteria. Metrologists define 
measurement as a structured process, comprising operative structures to assign numerical 
values to the measurands (entities to be measured) in reliable, valid and explicitly justified ways 
(Mari et al., 2017). Similarly, psychologists demand “observational procedures that are set up to 
work in such a way that, if an object of study is subjected to them, they generate output that 
carries information about the state, value, position, or constitution of the system with respect to 
the concept12 of interest” (Haig & Borsboom, 2008, p. 2). Measurement is thus an approach of 
data generation, targeted at obtaining quantitative information about study phenomena. As 
elaborated above, data (signs) are semiotic representations that can be stored, manipulated, 
decomposed and recomposed (e.g., on computer), that is, analyzed in lieu of the actual 
properties and phenomena under study (the referents) and in ways not applicable to these latter 
(in individuals). But inferences to these latter can be made only if the data represent relevant 
properties of the study phenomena in appropriate ways. This highlights the necessity of a basic 
representation theorem.  
A basic representation theorem 
 Measurement is the assignment of numerical values such that the conceptual properties 
and interrelations of the (lexical and numerical) signs used as data (e.g., variables and their 
values on computer) appropriately represent the study phenomena’s empirical properties and 
their interrelations (e.g., in individuals). This idea is basic to representational theory of 
measurement (RTM; Krantz et al., 1971). It formalizes axiomatic conditions by which empirical 
relational structures can be mapped to symbolic relational (data) structures (representation 
theorem), including permissible ways for transforming the latter without breaking their mapping 
onto the former (uniqueness theorem; Kyngdon, 2008a; Narens, 2002; Vessonen, 2017). But 
RTM stipulates neither theoretical concepts nor procedures for how and why any given empirical 
property could be mapped to a symbolic relational system, and many of its notions remain vague 
(Borsboom & Scholten, 2008; Mari et al., 2017).  
 
 
12 Note this instance of construct (concept)–referent conflation. 
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Still, and although clearly insufficient as a measurement theory, RTM stipulates the most 
basic principles underlying any kind of data generation in that information about study 
phenomena and their (qualitative and quantitative) properties (e.g., located in individuals) is 
encoded in signs (e.g., data variables on computer). This highlights that representation theorems 
also underlie the data generation methods used in psychometrics. Psychological assessment 
methods, especially rating scales, are however fraught with methodological, conceptual and 
terminological problems as explored now.  
Disparate notions of ‘behaviors’ and ‘responses’ in psychological assessment 
In psychology, given the challenges in distinguishing the study phenomena from the 
means used for exploring them, misconceptions frequently emerge about what actually 
constitutes the empirical relational system in a study. These misconceptions are promoted by 
the widespread labelling of both psychical and behavioral phenomena as ‘responses’ or (‘overt’ 
and ‘covert’) behaviors, likely misguided by the immaterial, transient and processual nature of 
both (Uher, 2016b). This undifferentiated terminology misleads researchers to ignore 
fundamental differences in these phenomena’s accessibility that profoundly impact research 
methodologies (Uher, 2019). It also entails another fallacy in psychological assessment. 
Specifically, when psychologists label both individuals’ finger movements for pressing buttons or 
ticking scales (Baumeister et al., 2007) and the mental processes involved in a given task as 
‘behaviors’ or ‘responses’, this blurs the distinction what actually constitutes the empirical 
relational system and which part of the data generation process requires a representation 
theorem as demonstrated now by the example of rating scales.  
Failed implementation of representation theorems in rating scales 
In rating methods, neither raters’ finger movements in themselves nor their ticks on the 
scales (as these behaviors’ residuals) nor raters’ judgement processes constitute the empirical 
relational system. These are just operational procedures involved in the mapping process in 
which raters match the outcomes of their judgements about the actual empirical system of 
interest (e.g., individuals’ behaviors, feelings or beliefs) to the symbolic relational system 
provided (e.g., rating scales on sheet). That is, the complex task of executing a data generation 
process that is intended to meet measurement criteria is delegated to raters, thus to lay people 
commonly unfamiliar with the measurement theories therefore needed. Raters are provided with 
neither information about these theoretical foundations nor instructions of how these could be 
applied to psychical and behavioral phenomena. By contrast, in physical and behavioral 
(ethological) measurement, measurement-executing persons are instructed and trained about 
how to use the given operative procedures for generating results.  
Ratings do not even constitute a method that—at least theoretically and with the 
necessary knowledge and instruction—could enable measurement at all. Indeed, rating methods 
fail to implement even a most basic representation theorem because rating items and scale 
categories serve both as descriptions of the empirical relational system (e.g., behavior and 
experience in individuals) and as symbolic relational system (e.g., item variables on sheet), 
leaving the two relational systems and the mapping relations between them unspecified (Uher, 
2018a). These specifications are left to implicit decisions made by respondents, which remain 
largely unexplored. Psychometricians commonly make only general assumptions about raters’ 
inattention, possible faking and response bias—unrelated to any specific referents to be judged, 
thus unrelated to the actual phenomena under study.  
Instead, psychometricians focus on the permissible transformations of rating data as 
specified in Stevens’ (1946) scale types (uniqueness theorems), likely because these stipulate at 
least some concrete quantitative concepts (later refined through latent variable theory, see 
below). Given Steven’s (1946) simplified definition of measurement as the “assignment of 
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numerals to objects and events according to rules” (p. 677), researchers recode raters’ choices 
of (lexically labelled) answer categories into numerals in always the same ways for all items, 
regardless of the phenomena and properties to which they refer. The uniqueness theorems, as 
specified through Steven’s scale types, are then regarded as the theoretical justification for 
interpreting these numerals as numbers.  
Numerals are signifiers (“a black mark on a piece of paper or certain sounds which I 
utter”, Campbell, 1920, p. 267) and thus arbitrary (e.g., 1, 5; I, V). Numbers, by contrast, are 
mathematical objects arising from ontological interrelations among real phenomena (Hartmann, 
1964). Numerals are often used to represent numbers but also just order (e.g., 1st, 5th) or only 
categorical—i.e., qualitatively different—properties that have no quantitative meaning at all (e.g., 
room ‘numbers’; Campbell, 1919/2020). Recoding rating scale categories in order to create 
‘quantitative’ data thus involves numeral–number equation, another instance of signifier–
meaning conflation. In conjunction with the conflation of the different notions of ‘response’ and 
‘behavior’, this leads psychologists to overlook that it is the raters who actually generate the 
data, whereas researchers’ recoding of scale categories is just the transposition of one symbolic 
system into another (Kyngdon, 2008a)—thus, only a step of data processing but not one of data 
generation (Uher, 2018a, 2019, 2020a). 
Correct responses, reaction times and their relations to psychical phenomena 
Unlike ratings, many psychodiagnostic methods record responses that have a fixed 
agreed meaning, such as correctness (e.g., in intelligence, educational and achievement test, 
problem-solving tasks, attention and concentration tests). Psychologists also often record 
reaction times, thus physical responses (e.g., in implicit association tests, flanker tasks, go/no go 
tests, lexical decision tasks). These methods simplify the assignment task that respondents must 
accomplish. They allow scientists to record (i.e., semiotically encode) the occurrence of correct 
responses and response times, which however are only outcomes of the psychical phenomena 
involved in their emergence. Hence, in these methods, it is these responses that constitute the 
empirical relational system to which the symbolic relational system is mapped, but not the 
psychical phenomena in themselves, thus not the actual phenomena under study. These latter 
can only be inferred from the responses recorded. But externally similar responses may emerge 
from different internal phenomena and different processes among them (i.e., they are 
polygenetic). Expected responses are therefore no guarantee that specific psychical processes 
have taken place. Moreover, the whole psychical system cannot exist without various 
subprocesses that must be present for a given process to emerge at all (e.g., perception, long-
term memory). That is, the existence of an internal phenomenon is no guarantee that it will also 
become manifest in observable outcomes and in expected ways. As a consequence, one-to-one 
inferences from recorded outcomes to the actual phenomena of interest cannot be made (for 
details, Toomela, 2008).  
These profound challenges must be considered when establishing measurement 
processes targeted at psychical phenomena. Some psychologists suggested psychometric 
approaches would be analogous to those that metrologists have developed for measuring 
physical properties that are not directly accessible. The remainder of this section introduces 
basic methodological principles underlying metrologists’ concepts of measurement and 
measuring instruments that are needed to scrutinize this assumption in the next section. 
Two basic methodological principles of measurement  
Metrologists elaborated a structural framework of physical measurement, involving 
epistemology, methodology and methods needed to devise processes that establish causal 
measurand–result relations (Mari et al., 2017). Previous analyses using the TPS-Paradigm 
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(Uher, 2020a) showed that, on a methodological level, this metrological framework builds on two 
basic principles—data generation traceability and numerical traceability.  
Data generation traceability: Object-dependent measurement processes 
The first methodological principle requires that the ways in which results are assigned to 
the quantity to be measured (measurand) in the study phenomena (objects) must be made fully 
transparent and thus traceable. To justify that the generated results are attributable to the 
measurands, measurement processes must be designed from knowledge about the study 
objects and their properties (called object-dependence or object-relatedness in metrology; Mari 
et al., 2017). This involves explanations how the specific operative structures allow to make 
numerical assignments such that they reveal reliable and valid information about these 
measurands, and only about them and not also on other influence properties (Mari et al., 2015). 
This knowledge must be implemented in unbroken documented chains of comparisons that 
connect the measurand with the result. At each step, the entities of the connected properties can 
be compared with one another regarding their quantities so that quantitative information from 
one property can be converted into quantitative information in another property, thus establishing 
proportional relations between the quantities of the different properties involved (see 
thermometer example below). 
Numerical traceability: Subject-independent results linked to known standards 
The second methodological principle of measurement underlying metrological 
frameworks requires that the numerical value assigned to the measurand is also linked to known 
standards, in likewise documented and transparent ways. The process design must ensure that 
results are invariant with respect to the persons (subjects; e.g., operators, users) involved (called 
subject-independence or inter-subjectivity in metrology). This means that results must be reliably 
interpretable and always represent the same information about the measurands across time and 
contexts (Mari et al., 2017). To ensure that the results have the same meaning everywhere (e.g., 
specific length of 1 meter), metrologists establish unbroken documented conversion (calibration) 
chains from primary references (e.g., international prototype meter) to all working references 
(e.g., meter rules) used for measurement in non-metrological research and everyday life 
(JCGM200:2012, 2012). Psychologists must develop (and have in parts already done so) 
analogous ways to establish an intersubjective meaning for their numerical results (e.g., time-
based measurements of behavior; answer categories with universally agreed meanings of 
correctness in educational and achievement tests).  
These two methodological principles are fundamental for measurement. But explicit 
analogous concepts had so far been lacking in psychology although both principles are—on their 
abstract methodological level—meaningfully applicable also in psychology (see below; (Uher, 
2020a). Moreover, both principles are also essential for instrument development. 
Measuring instruments: Conceptual foundations 
Instruments for physical measurement 
Technical instruments are devised to minimize the involvement of human abilities in 
measurement processes and to enable the measurement of physical properties that humans can 
perceive not directly (e.g., density) or not accurately enough (e.g., temperature). In such cases, 
operational procedures that systematically connect the measurand with the result are 
implemented via mediating properties, whereby the measurand empirically interacts with the first 
mediator in the chain, which in turn may interact with a further one, and so on. Thermometers, 
for example, structurally connect the properties ‘temperature’ and ‘spatial extension of tubed 
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mercury’ though physical laws13. The latter is connected with ‘length of extension over scale’ 
through visual comparison, and this, in turn, is connected with (data) variables and values’ 
through semiotic encoding14 (Uher, 2020a). 
What is the measuring instrument in psychological assessments? 
Metrologists conceive the psychologists’ generation of quantitative data directly by 
persons (e.g., raters, observers) as ‘human-based measurement’, ‘humans as measurement 
instrument’ (Pendrill, 2014), and ‘persons as data generation systems’ (Berglund et al., 2012). 
Thus, for metrologists, the person is the measuring instrument. Psychologists, by contrast, 
regard the items (statements, tasks) and answer categories as their ‘measuring’ instruments. 
Given this, they direct all efforts for instrument development and improvement at their tests and 
rating scales (e.g., psychometric properties) but not at the respondents’ abilities and knowledge 
for executing the data generation process as metrologists would do given their understanding of 
the persons as constituting the instruments (Uher, 2019).  
This conceptual difference illuminates further fallacies in psychometrics. Specifically, 
many psychologists assume that invariant quantities exist in their study phenomena (Michell, 
2008) and independently of the methods used (Borsboom & Mellenbergh, 2004). These naïve 
realist views entail the belief that ideal methods (e.g., rating scales) could allow to empirically 
implement an identity function that turns pre-existing ‘real’ quantities into estimated (manifest) 
scores (with definable errors or probabilities). But interactions between study property and 
method always influence the results obtained (Bohr, 1937; Heisenberg, 1927; Mari et al, 2017). 
In psychological investigations, these interactions are intricate because they are mediated by the 
data-generating persons who interact with (e.g., perceive, interpret—the meaning) both the 
study phenomena and properties (e.g., behaviors, experience, frequencies—the referents) and 
the methods used (e.g., rating scales—semiotic encodings, here their signifiers). Both 
metrologists' and psychologists’ notions of instruments fail to conceptualize these complex 
interactions, which derive from and thus reflect the triadic interrelations among signifier 
(symbolic system), referent (empirical system) and the meanings that both have for particular 
persons in particular contexts and which are essential for establishing these interrelations (and 
thus assignment relations between both systems). That is, establishing data generation and 
numerical traceability requires knowledge of raters’ understanding and use of items scales, 
which vary substantially (Uher, 2018a), as well as careful consideration of the intricate 
challenges that language-based methods entail for the important distinction of the study 
phenomena from the means used for exploring them.  
Psychometrics as measurement? A key assumption scrutinized 
The metatheoretical and methodological concepts of measurement and measuring 
instruments across sciences are now applied in this final section to scrutinize some scientists’ 
assumptions that psychometrics could constitute measurement. Specifically, they are used to 
scrutinize assumptions psychometrics would be analogous to metrological approaches of 
indirect or even direct physical measurement. 
 
 
13 Hence, instrument design requires knowledge of systematic (lawful) connections among properties, identifiable 
experimentally (Mari et al., 2017). But often, this knowledge is developed only during instrument development; thus, 
both processes are iterative and inform each other (Boon, 2015). 
14 These two latter steps are also often automatized to further reduce the involvement of human perceptual and 
conceptual abilities in measurement processes (Uher, 2020a).  
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Mistaken analogies of psychometrics with physical measurement 
In fundamental (direct) measurement, metrologists determine physical quantities through 
direct comparison and evidence of concatenation (e.g., length of rods). For those physical 
properties for which this is not possible because they are not directly accessible, metrologists 
developed various approaches of indirect measurement. Specifically, in derived measurement, 
properties are measured indirectly from relations between other properties, which must be 
measurable in themselves either directly or independently (e.g., density from mass and volume; 
Campbell, 1920). In associative measurement, scientists assume that the quantity to be 
measured (e.g., temperature) is systematically connected (associated) with another, 
independently measurable and already measured quantity (e.g., length of tubed mercury) such 
that, if the measured quantity is arranged in order of its magnitude, the quantity to be measured 
is arranged in order of its magnitude as well. This is established through unbroken connection 
chains that establish proportional relations among the divisible properties of the qualitative 
properties connected (data generation traceability). These assumptions must be supported by 
experimental evidence through cross-validation (Chang, 2004; Ellis, 1966) and later also by 
theories about the underlying physical mechanisms and processes (e.g., temperature as kinetic 
energy of particles; Boon, 2015; Mari et al., 2015). Psychometricians tried to adapt these 
concepts to their “non-physical” study phenomena by transforming the requirements of 
measurement into requirements of statistical assumptions.  
Psychometrics is not indirect (derived or associative) measurement  
For empirical investigations, abstract conceptual entities such as constructs must be 
operationally defined in concrete entities that are directly accessible and thus (potentially) 
measurable (referents, indicators). This is often thought to be analogous to indirect physical 
measurement, thereby justifying the common assumption that quantifications for constructs 
could be derived from quantifications of some of their referents as is done in psychometric 
scaling. But as constructs are only construed and do not exist as real entities in themselves, 
construct indicators cannot be identified through experimentation as is possible for physical 
properties and their interconnections. Instead, scientists use specific theories, face validity or 
common-sense to assume that particular indicators are representative of a construct; this is 
called fiat15 ‘measurement’ (Cicourel, 1964). But the decreed links cannot be proven or be 
‘discovered’ in nature because they are established through scientists’ interpretive decisions. 
Operational definitions (e.g., scales) of the same construct therefore often vary. 
Operationalization by decree is an unavoidable necessity for investigating constructs. But 
contrary to common beliefs, it is no step of measurement. To operationalize a construct, 
scientists specify the qualitative properties of study phenomena to which it is meant to refer. As 
abstractions, constructs typically refer to entities with heterogeneous qualities (e.g., different 
phenomena with different properties in which different aspects are emphasized). This makes it 
impossible to demarcate in constructs divisible entities of the same kind, thus quantities (Uher, 
2020a). A hypothetical example may illustrate this. If one construed a ‘weather’ construct, 
operationalized with temperature, air pressure, humidity and wind strength, one could not 
identify divisible properties (quantities) in this ‘weather’ construct in itself but only in each of 
these specific indicators, featuring different qualities and different divisible properties. Such 
conglomerates of heterogeneous qualities (blended concepts; (Uher, 2018b) are, however, 
widely used in psychology. ‘Extraversion’, for example, refers to a conglomerate of various 
experiencings, behaviors, but also beliefs and attitudes, thus not only to different concrete 
 
 
15 From the Latin fiat for “let it be done”. 
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phenomena each featuring different qualities but also to other conceptual phenomena. Such 
heterogeneous conceptual entities preclude the possibility to establish unbroken structural 
connections (causal links) to possible quantitative properties in the phenomena serving as their 
referents (construct indicators). ‘Nice weather’ cannot be causally linked, for example, to a 
temperature of 23 °C, an air pressure of 1023hPa, a relative humidity of 30% and a wind 
strength of 15 km/h. One may specify algorithms that define constellations of particular 
quantitative ranges for each of these qualitatively different weather indicators. But one cannot 
derive from them overall results to quantify ‘weather’ as is widely done, however, for 
psychological constructs like ‘extraversion’. This highlights that, data generation traceability 
cannot be established from constructs as the actual objects of research in themselves (e.g., 
‘intelligence’; ‘extraversion’, ‘weather’). This could be possible only for concrete indicators 
(referents) that are used as operationalizations (e.g., reaction times, task performances; physical 
properties used as indicators of ‘weather’)—an important point to consider when interpreting 
findings in construct research (for details, Uher, 2020a). 
Fiat ‘measurement’ was also likened to metrologists’ associative measurement 
(Torgerson, 1958). But the systematic structural relations of quantitative properties that are 
therefore required exist neither between psychical phenomena and the physical phenomena to 
which they are bound (e.g., brain physiology; Fahrenberg, 2013) nor between the entities of 
constructs and those of their (conceptual or concrete) construct referents. Unlike associative 
measurement, correspondence between the ordering of the assumed quantitative properties of 
constructs (e.g., ‘intelligence’) and the quantifications generated for their indicators (e.g., 
‘intelligence test’ scores) cannot be shown (Trendler, 2013).  
Psychometrics is not fundamental measurement  
In conjoint measurement theory (Luce & Tukey, 1964), the additivity requirement of 
fundamental measurement, evidenced through empirical concatenation (Campbell, 1920), is 
transformed into a statistical requirement (Bond & Fox, 2003). This mathematical method allows 
to construct scales for research objects featuring multiple properties that are assumed to interact 
with one another and to jointly affect a property of interest (e.g., product properties influencing 
overall product evaluation). Scales are constructed such that the values of the target property 
are a function of the assumed values of the single component properties, thus allowing for the 
determination of optimal composition rules for scales. In additive conjoint measurement, a 
specific composition rule is assumed in order to develop scales with additive properties and units 
of equal distances. This enables the experimental testing of hypothesized additive structures 
with clear falsification criteria (Bond & Fox, 2003). This theory was praised for allowing to 
represent “meaningful and invariant amounts of anything measured in an additive, divisible, and 
portable numeric form” (italics added; Fisher, 2009, p. 1279). For this reason, it was considered 
a revolution in social-science measurement, fueling hopes it may finally enable the 
measurement of psychical ‘attributes’ (Michell, 1997, 1999).  
This theory also underlies Rasch models (Rasch, 1980) that allow to transform nominal 
or ordinal manifest scores into interval scaled latent scores (Bond & Fox, 2003; Heene, 2013). 
The assumption that Rasch modelling—and latent variable modelling in general—could 
constitute measurement builds on the belief that the manifest data and the probabilities analyzed 
in them would constitute the empirical relational system under study (Borsboom & Scholten, 
2008). But, as demonstrated above, this fundamental misconception derives from variable–
referent and latent variable–construct conflations, numeral–number equation and the various 
misconceptions of semiotic systems in general. Specifically, probabilities are mathematical 
entities, not empirical entities (Kyngdon, 2008a). Psychometric models simply relate one 
numerical (symbolic) relational system to another instead of relating an empirical relational 
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system to a numerical16 one as often (at least implicitly) assumed. It is for this reason that 
numerical values of the latent scale are not assigned by rules but instead estimated through 
these models (see Michell, 1997). Empirical relational systems, by contrast, involve “sets whose 
members are natural objects, events or relations” (Kyngdon, 2008a, p. 91). The term empirical, 
meaning experience-based (from Greek empeiria for experience), denotes the fact that the 
entities accessible to empirical study “will consist of only a restricted set of … objects or events, 
given the limitations of human cognitive and sensory-motor capacities” (Kyngdon, 2008a, p. 90-
91; Uher, 2019).  
Measurement—modelling confusion 
It follows that psychometrics involves only data modelling but not data generation as 
required for measurement. This is also reflected in the facts that psychometric scales are the 
outcome of statistical data analysis and modelling, whereas measurement scales involve 
specific quantitative entities that are explicitly defined and agreed by convention before any 
measurement process is executed (BIPM, 2006). Statistics is not needed to develop 
measurement scales; physical measurement was successful long before statistics was 
developed (Abran et al., 2012). Indeed, Rasch models were developed from a mere 
mathematical framework (Rasch, 1980). “It is not necessarily wrong to develop mathematical 
models independently from empirical observations. But it is also not at all self-evident that 
empirical insights will result from such models” (Heene, 2013, p. 3). Measurement requires 
implementation of unbroken and traceable measurand–result connections (in RTM terms, 
systematic mapping relations between the empirical and the numerical relational structure), 
which involves testing the generated data for possible quantitative structures. But “in latent 
variable modelling in general, and Rasch modelling in particular, this is never done. Hence, 
Rasch enthusiasts are leaving something out and, according to Kyngdon [2008a], this something 
is not just important, but essential” (Borsboom & Scholten, 2008, p. 113).  
Psychometricians produce continuous scales solely from statistical operations carried out 
on symbolic relational systems—yet without explaining, or at least aiming to explore, how the 
empirical relational systems that they assume to ‘scale’—that is, psychical phenomena—can 
possibly vary that way. Neither Rasch models nor any other psychometric theories nor additive 
conjoint analysis provide a measurement framework in themselves (Trendler, 2009, 2013, 2019) 
and therefore enable neither fundamental nor any other kind of measurement. Psychometrics 
builds on a fundamental confusion of measurement with statistical modelling, thus of data 




16 Note that representation in a semiotic system (e.g., data) involves assignments not of numbers as sometimes 
assumed but of numerals the meaning of which must be first established empirically and through conventions. 
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Figure 3. Two incompatible epistemological frameworks underlying psychometric theory and 
practice. (a) Realist measurement framework sporadically invoked but neither theoretically 
elaborated nor empirically implemented; (b) operationalist framework of data modeling well 
elaborated and empirically implemented; (c) conceptual flipping between both. The term variable 
means here semiotic encodings of the study phenomena but not the study phenomena in 
themselves. 
Uher, J. (2021a). Psychometrics is not measurement: Unraveling a fundamental misconception in quantitative psychology and  
the complex network of its underlying fallacies [Target article]. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 41, 58–84.  






This network of fallacies and psychometricians’ focus on Steven’s scale types misled 
many to believe that assumptions of quantitative properties in psychical phenomena could be 
empirically tested through statistical models that allow to create latent scales with such 
properties. Following this assumption, psychometricians develop statistical theories and models 
that allow to transform nominal or ordinal scaled scores on manifest (data) variables into overall 
scores on continuous latent (data) variables, which are assumed to be interval or even ratio 
scaled. Such properties, however, are properties of the latent (data) variables, which are mere 
statistical concepts. Latent (data) variables are neither the psychological constructs (abstract 
conceptual entities) they encode nor the psychical phenomena that these constructs may 
describe. “Latent variable models are not detectors of unobservable latent structures, 
properties/attributes, causal sources, or anything else” (Maraun & Halpin, 2008, p. 115). They 
are only mathematical-statistical models used to analyze data once these are generated. Thus, 
they are not models in the classical sense in that some real-world phenomena are modelled—
i.e., represented in abstract ways to highlight structural patterns—because unbroken 
measurand–symbol connections are neither established nor even intended to be established 
(Kyngdon, 2008a; Maraun & Halpin, 2008). The quantitative properties identified in psychometric 
models can thus have only statistical and methodical origins, such as error structure (Michell, 
2008), the probability concepts invoked (Kyngdon, 2008a), and the simplistic encoding format of 
rating scales aligned to statistical requirements  rather than to divisible properties of the study 
phenomena (Uher, 2013, 2015d, 2018a). 
Back-and-forth switching between two incompatible epistemological frameworks  
This measurement—modelling confusion involves a repeated conceptual back-and-forth 
switching between two incompatible epistemological frameworks—1) an operationalist 
framework of data modelling that is well elaborated and empirically implemented and 2) a realist 
framework of measurement (data generation) that is sporadically invoked in theoretical 
considerations but neither theoretically elaborated nor empirically implemented (Figure 3c). This 
switching is difficult to recognize because it is masked by the disparate notions of key terms like 
‘variables’, ’traits’ and ‘attributes’ and their unnoticed conflation. It occurs not only in the debates 
between proponents of different lines of thinking but also in the same authors’ writings and often 
even in the same publication. This shows that this epistemological switching is inherent to the 
psychometric framework of thinking rather than reflecting only incompatibilities between different 
theoretical approaches. 
At the bottom of the measurement—modelling confusion lies the recognition that, in lack 
of properties in psychical phenomena that are amenable to concatenation, “it is impossible to 
construct a representation on the basis of observed relations in the way this is done in axiomatic 
theory” (Borsboom & Mellenbergh, 2004, p. 112; Ferguson et al., 1940). This misled 
psychometricians to belief that representation would be unimportant for measurement. “[T]he 
fact that no representation theorem can be proven is not particularly disastrous. Of course, it 
would be nice to have one, but it is perfectly all right to speak of measurement if one does not” 
(Borsboom & Mellenbergh, 2004, p. 116). But any data generation, and thus any measurement 
framework, involves some kind of representation because data are signs that scientists construct 
to encode (signifier) information (meaning) from their study phenomena and properties 
(referents) for the purpose of analyzing the symbolic system thus-created in lieu of the empirical 
system under study. 
Given the challenges for establishing representation theorems and the assumptions of 
their irrelevance, it is believed that “item response theorists must therefore take a philosophically 
important step: they have to assume, a priori, that a latent trait exists, and underlies our 
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observations” (p. 112). This statement, relying on the understanding of ‘traits’ as 
psychobiological phenomena existing in individuals, explicitly invokes the idea of a realist 
framework of measurement, thus contradicting the explicit belief representation would be 
unimportant. The realist assumption that phenomena and properties exist in the world and could 
potentially be made accessible to measurement has also driven early physicists and 
metrologists to develop pertinent theories and methodologies. But whereas many physical 
phenomena and properties were previously unknown and first had to be discovered (using 
suitable technologies) because they are generally imperceptible to humans, the existence of 
psychical phenomena is well-known because everyone can perceive at least those that are 
consciously accessible in oneself. Psychologists’ challenges derive instead from the “non-
physical” properties of psychical phenomena and their fundamental imperceptibility in others 
(Uher, 2016a). Hence, just assuming their existence does not answer the key question if and 
how measurement could be enabled (Michell, 2008) given their very special accessibility. 
“Stevens (1946) brought relief by suggesting we restrict our research questions and the 
use of statistics according to the structure of our measurement operations instead of restricting 
ourselves to properties that demonstrably have additive structure. For this purpose he loosened 
the notion of measurement to ‘the assignment of numerals according to rule’, and defined his 
famous scales of measurement (nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio) as dependent solely on the 
question which rule was followed in assigning the numerals” (italics added, Borsboom & 
Scholten, 2008, p. 111-112). Hence, psychologists focused on methodical and statistical 
operations that allow to produce additive structures in data. These operations involve, for 
example, recoding rating responses into numerals, their erroneous equation with numbers, 
operations of psychometric item analysis, iterative selection of only those item variables that 
allow to produce data with desired statistical properties while discarding those that do not (Uher, 
2015d, 2018a) as well as operations of psychometric modelling of latent (data) variables that 
statistically explain variations in the manifest (data) variables (e.g., those used to define and 
estimate true scores; see Borsboom, 2005). 
By focusing on these operations, psychometricians established a complex operationist 
framework of data processing and modelling that allows to produce statistically desired 
properties in empirical data. But none of these operations establish data generation traceability 
(unbroken measurand–result connections) and numerical traceability (linking the assigned 
numerical values to known standards) as needed for a framework of measurement. In 
psychometric modelling, systematic connections to the psychical phenomena studied in 
individuals are established neither theoretically nor empirically. Instead, quantitative structures 
are generated through specified operations of data processing (recoding) and statistical analysis 
(modelling). Interpretations of these quantitative structures are therefore bound to the particular 
operations used. “[O]perationism, as a philosophical theory of measurement, retains a 
discernable influence within psychology, for example, through S. S. Stevens’s theory of 
measurement, and through its links to true score theory (Borsboom, 2005). Yet, operationism is 
deeply problematic and is widely considered to be philosophically unacceptable” (Haig & 
Borsboom, 2008, p. 3).  
Psychometricians’ operationist framework is detached from the question of how the data 
that are being processed and modelled were generated in the first place, which would require 
implementation of a realist framework of data generation and measurement. In rating methods, 
this difficult task is left to respondents who must construct for the symbolic relational system 
provided (e.g., item variables, scale categories) specific meanings and who must specify an 
empirical relational system to which they can relate these meanings as well as suitable 
assignments relations that enable structure-preserving mappings between both systems (e.g., 
homo-morphisms). But psychometricians commonly do not consider the raters’ activities as the 
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actual data generation, likely because the conceptual switching between the disparate notions of 
‘variables’ misleads scientists to conflate items describing the study phenomena with these 
phenomena in themselves (variable–referent conflation). 
The measurement—data modelling confusion is also codified by the inconsistent use of 
the term ‘causality’, which contributes to the network of fallacies in psychometrics. 
Disparate notions of ‘causality’ fortify the network of fallacies in psychometrics 
The disparate notions of numerous key terms of psychological measurement (e.g., 
‘variables’, ‘attributes’, ‘responses’) and their frequent conflation mislead psychologists to 
confuse the unbroken causal connection chains from the study phenomena’s measurands to the 
results, needed to establish data generation traceability (and thus representation theorems), with 
the psycho-bio-social causes that underlie the emergence and functioning of the phenomena 
studied. This misconception is promoted by the frequent conflation of concrete phenomena in 
persons with the constructs (e.g., ‘traits’, ‘intelligence’) that scientists develop about them 
(construct–referent conflation). It is also fortified by psychologists’ frequent reification of 
constructs as concrete entities residing inside persons (e.g., ‘traits’ as psychophysical 
mechanisms) that causally explain the concrete phenomena from which they were first derived 
(e.g., behaviors), which entails explanatory circularity (widespread e.g., in ‘trait’ psychology; 
Uher, 2013). Constructs (conceptual entities) are also often conflated with their encoding in 
latent (data) variables (latent variable–construct conflation). All this contributes to the 
interpretation of latent (data) variables as reflecting the phenomena (e.g., psychical processing) 
that may causally underly the observable ‘responses’ encoded in the data (e.g., test 
performances). But latent (data) variables underlying manifest (data) variables are mere 
statistical concepts used to formally or mathematically describe structures in numerical data, 
regardless of what kinds of referents these may encode.  
This highlights that psychologists use the term ‘causality’ for at least three different 
relations, 1) for measurand–result connections, 2) for psycho-bio-social causes of target 
phenomena, and 3) for statistical relations between (data) variables. The first notion refers to a 
realist measurement framework, the third to an operationist framework of statistical modelling. 
The second, however, requires neither theories of measurement nor of statistics but explanatory 
theories about the phenomena studied. The confusion of these disparate concepts of ‘causality’ 
entails a repeated switching between their very different notions, which are linked to different 
epistemological frameworks, resulting in leaps in argumentation and the confusion of 
measurement with data modelling.  
Consequences  
The network of fallacies on which the framework of psychometric theory and practice is 
based misleads psychometricians to belief that the quantitative properties produced in the latent 
(data) variables through various methodical and statistical operations would reflect properties of 
psychical phenomena as the actual phenomena of interest in themselves, thus providing 
evidence for their hypothesized quantitative structure. This erroneous conclusion is masked by a 
repeated (and commonly unnoticed) conceptual back-and forth switching between two 
incompatible epistemological frameworks, of which only the operationist framework is 
implemented, both theoretically and empirically. But without a (critical) realist framework of 
measurement, psychometrics cannot ‘measure the mind’ as the field aspires to do. Psychometric 
modelling, as its name indicates, involves only data modelling—thus data analysis—but not data 
generation as required for measurement. This highlights that the use of the term ‘measurement’ 
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in psychometrics is erroneous and unrelated to that established in metrology, the physical and 
other sciences. This constitutes a serious cross-scientific jingle-fallacy that, given the high public 
trust that our societies place on scientific measurement (Porter, 1995), has far reaching 
consequences for science and applied fields. 
Inferences on psychical phenomena and thus persons inevitably biased 
The radical alignment of psychometric modelling and instrument development to 
statistical assumptions and desired data structures rather than to the properties of the actual 
study phenomena entails that, despite all statistical sophistication, psychometric results can 
reveal only biased information about psychical phenomena, if any information at all (Toomela, 
2008). As a consequence of this, it has “little real-world practical or even scientific consequence. 
For those who might doubt this, try and name just one result from the application of 
psychometrics in the last 50 years which has yielded a finding so important that it has changed 
the course of investigation and understanding of a phenomenon” (Barrett, 2008, p. 80). The 
focus on scaling techniques seems to have misguided psychometricians to overlook that 
creating scales is just a means to an end. “The Kelvin scale is a scientific achievement of first 
order, not merely because it provides a scale with mathematically powerful properties, but 
because it incorporates a profound understanding of how a certain class of phenomena works” 
(Duncan, 1984, p. 149). The aim of developing an understanding of the empirical study 
phenomena got out of sight in psychometrics. 
These insights, reinforcing those already made by other scholars before (see above), 
demand much more careful interpretation of psychometric scores than is currently the case. 
They contribute theoretical justification for the increasing scrutiny that practitioners are placing 
on psychometric scores, such as on their validity as legal evidence in courts. It can no longer be 
justified that decisions on the application of the death penalty for offenders rests—even if just in 
part—on psychometrically determined IQ scores expressed to two-decimal place precision 
(Barrett, 2018), given that measurement is not even involved at all. It is just a matter of time that 
psychometric scores will be challenged in courts, like forensic psychologists’ and psychiatrists’ 
diagnostic practices before (Barrett, 2018; Faust, 2012). 
Generating data about psychical phenomena: Key challenges 
Psychometricians have not yet succeeded in establishing a measurement framework. 
Instead, in the widely-used rating methods, this crucial task is left to respondents’ intuitive 
decisions, which are still hardly known, despite their intense use for almost a century now 
(Thurstone, 1928). This does not mean that rating data would be completely unrelated to the 
actual phenomena of interest; ultimately, ratings rest on common-sense knowledge and 
everyday words. But these are insufficient for developing scientific knowledge. Given the 
popularity of rating scales for creating quantitative data, it surprises how little has been invested 
in developing theories and empirical knowledge about how raters actually generate these data. 
Psychometricians neither provide nor build on pertinent theories (e.g., models of lexical stimulus 
perception and interpretation, theories about mental weighting of aspects considered for making 
decisions (Heene, 2013; Kyngdon, 2011; Uher, 2018a) as needed for establishing traceable data 
generation processes, and thus measurement. This also derives from the insufficiencies and 
vagueness of RTM and the failed implementation of at least a basic representation theorem in 
standardized rating methods. In lack of investigation of how raters actually interpret and use 
assessment scales, the serious violations of even the most basic preconditions of measurement 
in rating methods remained so far largely undetected.  
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Data generation methods capturing reaction times and ‘responses’ with specified 
meanings (e.g., correctness in ‘intelligence’ tests), by contrast, do enable the establishment of 
measurement processes. But this is possible only for these observable outcomes and not for the 
underlying psychical phenomena and processes as the actual phenomena of interest in 
themselves and one-to-one inferences to these latter are not possible. This is still not well 
considered in common interpretations of pertinent data (e.g., when ‘intelligence’ tests are 
interpreted as measuring ‘intelligence’ rather than intellectual performances). More efforts are 
needed to conceptually differentiate the phenomena involved (e.g., psychical versus behavioral 
phenomena). This involves methods that allow to implement both data generation traceability 
and numerical traceability, while carefully considering the peculiarities of psychical phenomena 
and thus inherent limitations. These two methodological principles, underlying structured 
frameworks of measurement established in metrology, are essential to ensuring robustness, 
replicability and usefulness of measurement data in all sciences. They are needed to enable 
public scrutiny and transparency, and to maintain a high degree of interpretability regarding 
study phenomena in the real-world and their properties.  
The key challenge for psychological methods of data generation, however, remains the 
important distinction of the study phenomena in themselves from the means (e.g., concepts, 
models, methods, terms and data) used for their exploration. This article showed that mastering 
this distinction is far more intricate than it may seem at first sight. It requires the development of 
differentiated conceptual frameworks and an unambiguous terminology17 in order to break up 
and overcome the network of fallacies and conflations that are codified in the measurement 
jargon currently established in psychology. 
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